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The Obama Administration’s conceptual change: imminence and the legitimation 
of targeted killings 
 
Abstract 
Starting in 2010, the Obama Administration engaged in an effort to justify drones strikes relying 
on the concept of ‘imminence.’ The aim of this article is to understand the reasons behind such 
insistence and to assess the Administration’s efforts at conceptual change. Building on 
Skinner’s and Bentley’s work, the article argues that the administration has followed an 
‘innovating ideologist’ strategy. The analysis shows how waves of criticisms exposed the 
administration to a key contradiction between its rhetoric of change that emphasised 
international law and the need for aggressive counter-terrorism. Reacting to this criticism, the 
administration has relied on imminence due to its connection with legitimate uses of force, 
while working to change the criteria for the concept, causing a shift away from imminent as 
‘immediate.’ Re-assessing Skinner’s place in IR, the article identifies conceptual change as a 
lens to assess foreign policy rhetoric and practice. The analysis emphasises the connection 
between actors’ intentions, beliefs and practices. It highlights the importance of criticism in 
engendering contradictions, exploring why only some criticisms are confronted. Finally, the 
article develops an original typology of the limits confronted by the innovating ideologist and 
methods to assess whether the actor has respected them. 
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Introduction 
Starting in 2010, the Obama Administration engaged in an effort to publicly justify and 
legitimise the use of force in counter-terrorism, with a focus on the use of drone strikes. In this 
effort, US officials made clear that the concept of imminence, that is the temporal proximity of a 
threat, played a prominent role in guaranteeing administration’s compliance with international 
law. The same officials, however, also argued that imminence should have moved away from a 
strict interpretation of imminent as ‘immediate.’1  The administration’s reliance on imminence 
and the changes brought to the concept attracted criticisms and a few interpretations. Scholars 
and commentators argued that the concept had lost any meaning and it was used as a pretext to 
conduct targeted killings.2 What these criticisms failed to provide was an interpretation as to 
why the administration put so much emphasis on imminence and made a concerted effort to 
define (and redefine) criteria for imminence. Among the few authors providing an 
interpretation, Benjamin Wittes and Wells Bennett agreed that the administration relied on 
imminence because such language was already available in the vocabulary of the executive 
branch.3 Noura Erakat also argued that the administration’s interest in imminence reflected a 
                                                            
1 John Brennan, ‘Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws,’ Harvard Law School, 
16 September 2011, available at: {http://opiniojuris.org/2011/09/16/john-brennan-speech-on-obama-
administration-antiterrorism-policies-and-practices/} accessed 27 October 2015. 
2
 Rosa Brooks, ‘The Constitutional and counterterrorism implications of targeted killings,’ Testimony 
before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitutions, Civil Rights and Human Rights, 23 April 
2013a, available at: 
{http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1114&context=cong} accessed 27 
October 2015, p. 13. Conor Fiedesdorf, ‘Obama's Memo on Killing Americans Twists 'Imminent Threat' 
Like Bush,’ The Atlantic, February 2013, available at: 
{http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/02/obamas-memo-on-killing-americans-twists-
imminent-threat-like-bush/272862/} accessed 27 October 2015. 
3
 Wells Bennett, ‘A clue about the origins of imminence in the OLC memo,’ The Lawfare Blog, 25 June 
2014, available at: {http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/a-clue-about-the-origins-of-imminence-in-the-
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long-standing effort by the US to expand the justifications for its use of force.4 This article 
argues that these interpretations are valid, but not sufficient. Imminence was already present, but 
the Obama Administration’s focus on the concept was qualitatively different. Kenneth 
Anderson and Wittes conceded this point, admitting that the administration’s strong reliance on 
imminence remains a ‘mystery.’
5   
The puzzle being investigated in this article is, then, why 
imminence? 
Starting from Michelle Bentley’s study of conceptual change and her introduction of Quentin 
Skinner’s work in the US foreign policy discourse,
6 
 the article argues that the Obama 
Administration adopted what Skinner called an ‘innovating ideologist’ strategy. As Bentley 
writes, innovating ideologists ‘select or construct conceptual interpretations in ways that serve 
their political ambitions.’
7
 In the administration’s project, the reliance on the concept of 
imminence permitted the respect of conventions regarding legitimate uses of force against an 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
olc-memo/} accessed 27 October 2014; Benjamin Wittes, ‘Whence Imminence in that Drone Memo? A 
Puzzle and a Theory,’ The Lawfare Blog, 24 June 2014, available at: 
{http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/whence-imminence-in-that-drone-memo-a-puzzle-and-a-theory/} 
accessed 27 October 2015. 
4
 Noura Erakat, ‘New Imminence in the Time of Obama: The Impact of Targeted Killings on the Law of 
Self Defense,’ Arizona Law Review, 56 (2014), pp. 195-248. 
5
 Kenneth Anderson and Benjamin Wittes, Speaking the law (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2013), p. 
107. 
6
 Michelle Bentley, ‘The long goodbye: beyond an essentialist construction of WMD,’ Contemporary 
Security Policy, Vol. 33:2 (2012), pp. 384-406, Michelle Bentley, ‘War and/of words: constructing WMD 
in US foreign policy,’ Security Studies, 22 (2013), pp. 68-97, Michelle Bentley, ‘Strategic taboos: 
chemical weapons and US foreign policy,’ International Affairs, 90:5 (2014a), pp. 1033-1048 and 
Michelle Bentley, Weapons of Mass Destruction in US foreign policy (London: Routledge, 2014b). 
7 Bentley (2013), p. 76. 
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imminent threat.8 At the same time, the administration worked on innovating the concept, to 
expand the boundaries of its counter-terrorism practices.  
An exploration of how the Obama Administration justified its drone strikes and its targeted 
killing practices - and of the role played by international law - is particularly timely. Several 
countries have adopted drones strikes and targeted killing in their counter-terrorism approach. 
Even more importantly, it is clear that several of these countries are following the example set 
by the United States in justifying their use of force.9 The article also answers various calls from 
different corners of International Relations as a discipline. In particular, several scholars have 
called for a renewed engagement with concepts and concept analysis,10 demonstrated also by a 
recent emphasis on conceptual histories.11 Others have called for an increased focus on 
                                                            
8
 Quentin Skinner, ‘Language and Political change,’ in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell Hanson R 
(eds.), Political Innovation and Conceptual change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 
21. 
9
 Frances Gibb, ‘Attorney-general sets out legal basis for drone strikes abroad,’ The Times, 12 January 
2017, available at {http://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/law/attorney-general-sets-out-legal-basis-for-
drone-strikes-abroad-f73ctmwqm} accessed 12 January 2017 and Anthony Dworkin, ‘European countries 
edge towards war on terror,’ ECFR Report, 9 September 2015, available at: 
{http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_european_countries_edge_towards_war_on_terror4015} 
accessed 3 February 2017. 
10
 Stefano Guzzini, ‘The ends of international relations theory: stages of reflexity and modes of 
theorizing,’ European Journal of International Relations, 19:3 (2013), pp. 521-541 and Felix 
Berenskoetter, ‘Approaches to concept analysis,’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 45:2 
(2017), pp. 151-173.  
11
 See John Bew, Realpolitik: a history (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) and David Armitage, 
Civil Wars: a history in ideas (Yale: Yale University Press, 2017). 
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processes of legitimation, especially when it comes to the use of force,12 and for a livelier 
dialogue between IR and international law scholars.13 
Answering these calls, the article makes both theoretical and empirical contributions. From a 
theoretical perspective, this article places conceptual change at the centre of processes of 
legitimation and emphasises the importance of strategies of conceptual change in understanding 
foreign policy rhetoric and practice. By analysing conceptual change surrounding imminence, 
the article also addresses the legitimating role played by international law. The article also 
expands on the current understanding of conceptual change in IR. It emphasises the role of an 
actor’s intentions and beliefs in driving his/her innovation strategies. It gives more prominence 
to arguments made by Robert Martin,14 Terence Ball15 and James Farr16 on the importance of 
criticism and contradictions in creating the conditions for conceptual change. Throughout the 
analysis, the article also suggests that Bentley might be too pessimistic regarding the place of a 
Skinnerian approach in IR. At the empirical level, the article contributes to the literature on the 
                                                            
12
 Ian Hurd, ‘The permissive power of the ban on war,’ European Journal of International Security, 2:1 
(2016), pp. 1-18 
13
 See among others Karin M. Fierke and Knud Jorgense, Constructing International Relations: the next 
generation (London: Routledge 2015), p. 15 and David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Helen Lambert, 
International Law and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 3. 
14 Robert W. T. Martin, ‘Context and contradiction: toward a political theory of conceptual change,’ 
Political Research Quarterly, 50:2 (Jun. 1997), pp. 413-436. 
15
Terence Ball and J. A. G. Pocock, ‘Introduction,’ in (Eds.), Terence Ball and J. A. G. Pocock, 
Conceptual change and the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988), Terence Ball, “A 
Republic - If you can keep it,” in Terence Ball and J. A. G. Pocock (Eds.), Conceptual change and the 
Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988), Terence Ball, Transforming Political 
Discourse (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988) and Terence Ball, ‘Party,’ in Terence Ball, James Farr and 
Russell Hanson (Eds.), Political Innovation and conceptual change (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989) 
16
 James Farr, ‘Conceptual change and constitutional innovation,’ in Terence Ball and J. A. G. Pocock 
(Eds.), Conceptual change and the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988) and James 
Farr, ‘Understanding Conceptual change politically,’ in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell Hanson 
(Eds.), Political Innovation and conceptual change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
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Obama Administration’s foreign policy and on drones and targeted killings. The article provides 
an analysis of the administration’s foreign policy and its approach to international law. It brings 
forward a new interpretation of the legitimation of targeted killings. Finally, it contributes to the 
debate on continuities and changes between the Bush and Obama years. 
This article can be divided into three main sections. The first section will explore Bentley’s and 
Skinner’s arguments. The second section will look at conventions surrounding imminence, 
expanding on the different approaches to imminence and international law adopted by the Bush 
and Obama Administrations. The final section will detail the administration’s conceptual 
change. The conclusion will stress the importance of conceptual change as a lens to explore 
foreign policy rhetoric and practice. 
Skinner, Bentley and International Relations 
Skinner’s third way: actors, beliefs and intentions 
As Bentley writes, Skinner’s approach is based on the study of speech-acts and on the 
assumption that we can do things with words.17 Skinner focuses on the illocutionary effects of 
an utterance (defined as its intended significance) as they permit a ‘grasp of the point of the 
action for the agent who performed it’ [emphasis added].18 Skinner is interested in an actor’s 
                                                            
17
 Bentley (2014b), p. 24 and John L. Austin, How to do things with words, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1975). John Searle, Speech acts: an essay in the philosophy of language (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969). 
18
 Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of ideas,’ History and Theory 8:1 (1969), 
p. 44 and Kari Palonen, Quentin Skinner: history, politics, rhetoric (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), pp. 
43-44. 
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intention ‘in doing’ something, it is an ‘intent-centric’ approach.19 This approach is not simply 
‘negative,’ as Bentley suggests, that is a critique of Derrida-inspired arguments that negate the 
role of an actor’s intentions.
20
 It is an effort to chart a third way between Derridean claims and 
the ‘discredited hermeneutic ambition of stepping empathetically into other people’s shoes.’21 In 
her analysis, Bentley suggests that critics of Skinner abound.
22
 Bentley’s view, however, 
excludes many points of contact between Skinner and IR. In Skinner’s view, the study of how 
concepts have developed and have become accepted serves emancipatory purposes.23 Skinner’s 
aim in writing conceptual history finds resonance in critical theory.
24
 Skinner’s approach has 
also found support among constructivist scholars. Christian Reus-Smit has shown that the 
constructivist philosophy of history is ‘“Skinnerian” in essence.’25 
For Skinner, the aim of the scholar should be to provide an interpretation of the utterance and of 
the actor’s intentions in making it. ‘Intentions can be inferred from an understanding of the 
conventional significance of the act itself.’26 Utterances represent ‘interventions’ in a context 
and by looking at this context we can hope to ‘refine’ our interpretation of an actor’s 
                                                            
19
 See Bentley (2014b), p. 25, Quentin Skinner, ‘Motives, intentions and interpretations,’ in Quentin 
Skinner, Visions of Politics, Volume I, Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002a). 
20
 Bentley (2014b), p. 25. 
21
 Skinner (2002a), pp. 120-122. 
22 Bentley (2013), p. 77 and Bentley (2014b), pp. 25-26. See also Ronald Krebs, Narrative and the 
Making of US National Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) and Christian Reus-
Smit, ‘Reading history through constructivist eyes,’ Millennium, 37:2 (2008), pp. 395-414. 
23
 Skinner (2002a), p. 6, Skinner (2002b), p. 126. 
24 Duncan S. A. Bell, ‘Language, Legitimacy and the project of critique,’ Alternatives, 27 (2002), p. 335. 
See also Brett Bowden, The Empire of Civilization: the evolution of an imperial idea (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 2 and 7-10. 
25 
Reus-Smit, ‘Reading history,’ pp. 400-401 and 403-409. 
26 Skinner (2002a), p. 119. 
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intentions.27 Looking at Skinner’s account, this interpretation can be corroborated through a 
three-step process. First, we should assume that whatever an actor was doing, it was doing it 
intentionally.
28
 Second, since intentions depend on beliefs we should make sure that the actor 
possesses beliefs that are compatible with the intentions we are assigning him/her. The 
attribution of intentions can also be strengthened by the discovery that the actor had a motive.
29
  
Third, one should note that principles are professed with certain consistency; they aim at 
locating an utterance in a precise normative and linguistic context.30 We should then corroborate 
the interpretation by examining the coherence of an actor’s beliefs.
31
 We should assess whether 
an actor’s current utterances conform to same traditions and approaches, whether they are 
compatible with other utterances, and whether an actor’s utterances have followed similar 
traditions and approaches in the past. We should look at his/her track record. 
Context, contradiction and criticism: mechanics and conditions for conceptual change 
For Skinner, Bentley notes, conceptual change is driven by two main dynamics.32  First, an 
exogenous shock might leave a concept in a status of ‘semantic confusion.’ This refers to 
uncertainty regarding the criteria and extent of a concept often due to the co-existence of several 
interpretations.33 This argument is familiar to IR scholars who have identified an exogenous 
                                                            
27 Skinner (2002a), p. 117. 
28
 Skinner (2002a), p. 119. 
29
 Skinner (2002a), p. 119. 
30
 Quentin Skinner, ‘Augustan party politics and Renaissance constitutional thought,’ in Quentin Skinner, 
Visions of Politics: Volume II, Renaissance Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002b), p. 
348. 
31
 Skinner (2002a), p. 119. 
32
 Bentley (2014b), p. 25. 
33 Bentley (2013), p. 75 and Skinner (1989), p. 17. 
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shock as a catalyst giving actors the opportunity to reshape the environment.34 Several scholars 
have also highlighted how the manipulation of exogenous shocks permits actors to adopt 
policies that would have been unthinkable prior to such shock.
35
 Jackson and Tsui have argued 
that change is almost impossible without an exogenous shock.36 
For Skinner and scholars of conceptual change, however, a second, quieter option exists: change 
through ‘ongoing debates.’
37
 As Martin writes, Skinner’s account of this second option does not 
elucidate the conditions for conceptual change and the ‘mechanics’ of this process.38 One of the 
main reasons is Skinner’s ‘extreme economy of context.’
39
 Skinner mainly focuses on the 
linguistic contexts, excluding ‘semi-linguistic’ factors, such as political and socio-economic 
factors.40 Understanding conceptual change, they argue, requires a more detailed analysis of 
context and contextual shifts.
41
 As Martin writes: 
A shift in the relevant contexts, be they political, social, intellectual, or whatever, 
often triggers conceptual change by enabling or constraining certain lines of 
                                                            
34
 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change,’ 
International Organization 52:4 (1998), p. 909. Jeffrey Legro, Rethinking the world: great power 
strategies and international order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
35
 Mary Dudziak, Wartime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Francois Debrix, Tabloid Terror 
(London: Routledge, 2008), Stuart Croft, Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
36 Richard Jackson and Chin-Kuei Tsui, ‘War on terror II: Obama and the adaptive evolution of US 
counterterrorism,’ in Michelle Bentley and Jack Holland (Eds.), The Obama Doctrine (London: 
Routledge, 2017), p. 80. 
37
 Bentley (2014b), p. 25 
38 Martin (1997), p. 414. 
39
 Martin (1997), p. 417. 
40
 Skinner (1969), p. 49 and Martin (1997), pp. 421-422. 
41
 Terence Ball, Transforming Political Discourse (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 15 
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criticism or by highlighting certain new or extant contradictions. These contextual 
shifts, then, can best be seen as occasions of conceptual change.42 
Martin’s point makes clear that the identification of the relevant contexts and of the defining 
shifts will depend on the conceptual change being studied. Felix Berenskoetter has recognised 
the difficulties in clearly defining context and the need to move beyond the purely semantic 
context.
43
 The present analysis of conceptual change will focus on two main contexts: the 
strategic context of the Obama Administration’s conduct of counter-terrorism and the domestic, 
political context in which the administration justifies and legitimates its conduct.
44
  
Furthermore, among the many potentially relevant contextual shifts, one should isolate those 
that highlight contradictions setting the stage for conceptual change.45 In her analysis, Bentley 
discusses the role of contradictions in driving conceptual change.
46
 However, as Farr argued, 
policy-makers confront plenty of contradictions and yet only some lead to conceptual change.47 
It is criticism that forces actors to revise the concepts they are professing and the criteria 
defining those concepts in a way that eases the contradiction.
48
 Criticism is a quintessentially 
                                                            
42 Martin (1997), p. 425. 
43
 Berenskoetter (2017), p. 160. 
44
 See Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin / Valerie Hudson, Derek H. Chollet, and James 
Goldgeiger. Foreign Policiy Decision-making Re-visited (New York, Palgrave and MacMillan, 2002). 
45 Martin (1997), p. 429. 
46
 Bentley (2014b), p. 25.  
47
 Farr (1989), p. 26. See also Martin (1997), pp. 424-425. 
48
 Terence Ball and J. A. G. Pocock, Introduction,’ in (Eds.), Terence Ball and J. A. G. Pocock, 
Conceptual change and the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988), p. 4. 
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political action49 which brings contradictions, of which an actor was unaware or that an actor 
had tried to hide, to the fore creating the conditions for conceptual change.50  
To be sure, actors feel the need to answer only some criticisms, hence, only some lines of 
criticism lead to conceptual change. Conceptual change represents a problem-solving strategy. 
Engaging in conceptual change, the actor clearly has multiple aims. S/he is trying to achieve 
political and strategic objectives, s/he is trying to quiet opposition, that is, to convince an 
audience of the appropriateness of his/her behaviour; finally, conceptual change also represents 
an effort to ease the discomfort created by contradiction.
51
 In the latter sense, conceptual change 
acts as a strategy to reduce what the political-psychology literature calls dissonance. As Robert 
Jervis reported, purely negative strategies like the avoidance of dissonant information are rare.52 
An actor tends to adopt positive strategies to reduce the discomfort created by dissonant 
information.53 These strategies, Ole Holsti detailed, include discrediting the source, 
reinterpreting the information in a positive light, but also modifying or changing existing 
attitudes and ideas. It is in this last option that conceptual change plays a role. Holsti has 
provided suggestions as to which contradictions will be ignored, which will be answered, and 
how. One should look at the contents and source of the dissonant information, at situational 
factors, and at personality factors.
54
 As Farr argued, in political life, contradictions can emerge 
                                                            
49
 Farr (1989), p. 35.  
50
 James Farr, ‘Conceptual Change and constitutional innovation,’ in Ball and Pocock (1988), pp. 24-25 
51
 Farr (1989), p. 34. 
52 Robert Jervis, Perceptions and misperceptions in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), pp. 386-387.  
53
 Ole Holsti, ‘Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy,’ Journal of International Affairs, 21:1, 
1967, p. 19. 
54 Holsti (1967), p. 22. 
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from a contrast between the propositions and beliefs an actor advances and his/her practices.55 
In this case, going back to Holsti, we can identify a case in which the incoming information is in 
line with an actor’s beliefs but exposes contradictions (is dissonant) with his/her practices. The 
most likely strategy to ease contradiction – hinted at, but not explored by Holsti - will be that 
the actor would alter ideas and concepts to show how his/her practices could actually be 
interpreted through the lens of those beliefs. In this sense, we can argue that the closer a 
contradiction is to an actor’s beliefs, interests and public image, the more probable his/her 
engagement in conceptual change to legitimate behaviour. The analysis will show how shift in 
the strategic and political context created waves of criticisms. Coming from sources close to the 
Obama administration’s beliefs, and touching upon key beliefs, interests and principles held by 
the administration, these waves of criticism exposed a key contradiction and endangered the 
administration’s objectives, creating the conditions for conceptual change. 
The innovating ideologist strategy and its limits 
Among various processes of conceptual change, Skinner identified the task of innovating 
ideologists, that is, actors who are engaged in the legitimation of questionable actions.56 
Innovating ideologists rely on the manipulation of evaluative-descriptive terms, used to 
commend or condemn the actions, which they are employed to describe. The use of a concept 
implies not only its meaning but also a ‘definite normative colour.’57 To understand a concept 
                                                            
55
 Farr (1989), p. 35. 
56
 Quentin Skinner, ‘Some problems in the analysis of political thought and action,’ Political Theory 2:3 
(1974a), p. 294. 
57 Palonen (2003), p. 51. 
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we must understand ‘the range of things that can be done with it.’58 In Skinner’s view one of the 
main strategies consists in the manipulation of favourable evaluative-descriptive terms.
59
 This 
strategy is based on two prongs. First, the actor has to ‘insist, with as much plausibility as he 
can muster that, in spite of any contrary appearances, a number of favourable evaluative-
descriptive terms can in fact be applied as apt descriptions of his own apparently untoward 
social actions.’
60
 Second, s/he manipulates ‘the criteria for the application of an existing set of 
favourable evaluative-descriptive term.’61  
The focus on a favourable evaluative-descriptive term has implications for the identification of 
the limits an innovating ideologist confronts. This article identifies an original typology of 
limits. The first type of limits concerns the ‘availability’ of a concept. The range of evaluative-
descriptive terms (with a positive connotation) available is limited and this availability is 
beyond the ideologist’s control.62 In choosing a term, Skinner argues, an actor should challenge 
his/her opponents on their own terms, by showing that terms they are using to describe actions 
they approve of are compatible with his/her behaviour.
63
 The actor needs to ‘be able to call upon 
an already existing stock of concepts.’64 In IR, this argument is compatible with constructivist 
emphasis on the ‘fit,’ ‘adjacency’ and ‘appropriateness’ of new norms.65  
                                                            
58
 Quentin Skinner, ‘A reply to my critics,’ in James Tully (ed.), Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner 
and his critics (Cambridge: Polity Press: 1988a). See Skinner (1974a), pp. 290-291. 
59
 Skinner (1974a), p. 298. 
60
 Skinner (1974a), p. 298. 
61
 Skinner (1974a), p. 298. 
62 Skinner (1974a), p. 300. 
63
 Skinner (1974a), p. 294. 
64
 Ball (1989), p. 157. 
65
 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), pp. 807 and 908. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Transnational 
Advocacy networks in international and regional politics,’ International Social Science Journal 159 
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Once an ideologist has settled on an available concept, s/he confronts additional limits 
concerning the plausibility of the conceptual manipulation. As Bentley argues, conceptual 
manipulation represents a balance between innovation and convention: ‘conceptual flexibility 
has to “answer” and justify itself, to convention.’66 Skinner acknowledged that the ‘dominance’ 
of practices and conventions depends to a large extent on the ‘power of our normative language 
to hold them in place.’
67
 However, he also emphasised the difficulties an ideologist confronts in 
convincing the audience of the plausibility of his/her claims.68 Manipulating existing terms 
constitutes a ‘linguistic sleight-of-hand.’
69
 The ideologist runs a double risk of failing. If in the 
process of innovation he drops too many of the criteria that define the concept, s/he runs the risk 
of failing by making his/her ‘sleight’ too visible. If s/he doesn’t drop enough criteria, s/he runs 
the risk that the concept won’t cover his/her actions after all.
70
 The tailoring of a concept, 
however, like the availability of terms, is not totally under the control of the actor.71 Ideologists 
can rely ‘on some freedom for manoeuvre…in the criteria for the application of the relevant 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
(1999), pp. 89-101 and Ann Fiorini, ‘The Evolution of International Norms,’ International Studies 
Quarterly 40:3 (1996), pp. 363-389, Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention (New Delhi: Manas 
Publications, 2009a), p. 15. 
66 Bentley (2014b), p. 127. 
67
 See Bentley (2013), pp. 76-77 and Skinner (2002a), p. 7. 
68
 Even in his more recent focus on ‘paradiastole,’ Skinner has maintained the need for ‘neighbourliness’ 
in conceptual manipulation. Skinner (2002a), pp. 182-184. See also Quentin Skinner, ‘Rhetoric and 
conceptual change,’ Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought, 3 (1999), pp. 67-68, Ball (1989), p. 157 and 
Skinner (1974a), p. 299. 
69
 Skinner (1974a), p. 298. 
70
 Skinner (1974a), p. 298. 
71 Skinner (1974), p. 300. 
Page 14 of 47
Cambridge University Press
European Journal of International Security
For Peer Review
15 
 
normative terms,’72 but what they can hope to legitimate depends on what they can plausibly 
portray as compatible with ‘existing normative principles’ [emphasis added].73  
Finally, the strategist confronts limits that concern his/her credibility. S/he is ‘obliged to behave 
in such a way that actions remain compatible with the claim that the legitimating principles 
genuinely motivated them.’
74
 The innovating ideologist looking to legitimate his/her behaviour 
must tailor ‘his normative language in order to fit his projects’ - the limits discussed by Bentley 
- but also tailor ‘his projects in order to fit the available normative language.’75 Since actors 
cannot stretch existing terms indefinitely, ‘they can only hope to legitimise, and hence to 
perform, a correspondingly restricted range of actions.’76 Here, Skinner argues, innovating 
ideologists ‘have no freedom to act’ except in ways compatible with their legitimating 
principles.
77
 The point of this third type of limits is that whether we regard stated principles as 
‘flapdoodles’ is largely inconsequential.78 First, we still need to explain why the actor has 
decided to propagate ‘one brand of flapdoodle rather than another, and to propagate one 
particular brand with such remarkable consistency.’
79
 This concerns the availability and the 
normative colour of those principles. Second, professed princ ples (whether an actor believes in 
them or not) affect his/her freedom of action and hence should play a role in explaining his/her 
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behaviour.80 IR as a discipline has recognised the importance of justifications and legitimacy.81 
In Nicholas Wheeler’s words, ‘justification is a critical enabling condition of action and not 
simply a rationalization of decisions taken for other reasons.’
82
 Like Skinner’s innovating 
ideologists, Wheeler’s humanitarian states - having claimed the moral high ground - will 
engender ‘the suspicion that they had hidden motives’ if their actions contradict their 
legitimating principles.
83
 
Assessing whether an actor has adopted an available concept requires assessing the concept 
intellectual and (in this case) legal history and what ‘colour’ the concept has carried in the 
practices of actors (in this case states and governments); that is whether the concept has a 
connotation compatible with the use by the actor and his/her intentions. As to the plausibility of 
the manipulation, the judgment regarding the success of the manipulation, as Farr argued, does 
not belong to the actor alone; ‘a community’ must be convinced.84 Assessing whether a 
manipulation is plausible should, then, rely on a comparison between how the concept has been 
understood in the relevant community - and in the practice of states
85
 - and the use by the actor, 
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as well as on the reception of the actor’s manipulation within such community. Finally, an 
assessment of credibility should rely on the coherence between stated aims, legitimating 
principles and practices, that is, conduct of the actor. The actions of the actor should be aligned 
with his/her legitimating principles. As Wheeler argued, one should show that the actor did not 
act in situations not covered by the chosen legitimating principles.
86
 Actors should avoid 
discrepancies between their legitimating principles and their actions.  
 
Imminence and the use of force 
Conventions, availability and normative colour 
Before focusing on the administration’s actions, in line with Skinner’s suggestion, it is 
necessary to focus on the ‘conventions surrounding the performance of such actions,’
87
 that is, 
the conventions surrounding imminence. This contributes to assessing the availability of 
imminence and its normative colour. Discussing imminence, Anderson and Wittes write: 
It is a bit of a mystery…whether the administration is using it to address resort-to-
force matters under international law, to tackle domestic separation-of-powers 
questions…or perhaps as a prudential invocation of the standards of international 
human rights law.’
88
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The point made here is that imminence represents a favourable evaluative descriptive term in all 
these contexts. In the US domestic context, the Supreme Court, in a series of historical cases 
concerning the Fourth Amendment (banning unreasonable seizures) such as Tennessee v. 
Garner and Brandenburg v. Ohio has identified the imminence of the threat posed as the criteria 
distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate uses of force.
89
 In foreign policy, the Constitution 
gives the president the power to repel an imminent threat; a power confirmed by the 1973 War 
Powers resolution.90 At the international level, in International Human Rights Law (IHRL), a 
recent report has clarified that the right to life requires deadly force to be used only to protect 
against an imminent threat and after other options have been explored.
91
 Once again, the 
suggestion is not that these standards are the same, but that imminence distinguishes legitimate 
from illegitimate uses of force.  
Similarly, in international law, imminence has always played a prominent role in discussions 
regarding a state’s right to use force featuring heavily in the opinions of classical international 
law scholars.
92
 Self-defence in customary international law includes a very restrictive notion of 
pre-emptive action based on the Caroline criteria: the use of force is legitimate only in 
situations in which the threat ‘is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no 
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moment for deliberation.’93 Imminence here is a ‘temporal requirement.’94 The prohibition of 
the use of force enshrined in article 2(4) of the UN Charter seemed to put an end to the 
possibility of pre-emption. Some legal scholars found refuge in article 51’s protection of an 
‘inherent right’ of self-defence.95 The word ‘inherent,’ they argued, meant that the aim of the 
Charter was to complement, and not to abolish the customary notion of imminence and pre-
emptive action.
96
 The International Court of Justice has been unable to provide definitive 
clarifications on the matter.97 Ruys argued convincingly that before 9/11 the predominant view 
of article 51 of the Charter was a restrictionist one, rejecting anticipatory uses of force.
98
 Several 
authors, however, have pointed out that preemptive actions such as Israel’s behaviour in the Six 
Days War have generally been considered more favourably than preventive actions, such as 
Israel’s 1981 bombing of Iraq’s Osirak nuclear plant.
99
 The distinction depended on the 
‘imminence’ of the threat.  
Since the 1980s, the emergence of international terrorism has brought the issues of imminence 
and pre-emption under the spotlight, especially in the United States. The Reagan Administration 
through National Security Decision Directive 207 and the ‘Shultz Doctrine,’ seemed to suggest 
                                                            
93
 Neta Crawford, ‘The Justice of Preemption and Preventive War Doctrines,’ in Mark Evans (ed.), Just 
War Theory: a Reappraisal (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2005). 
94 Erakat (2014), p. 203. 
95
 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, available at: {http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-
charter/chapter-viii/index.html} accessed 28 October 2015. 
96
 Noam Lubell, ‘The problem of imminence in an Uncertain World,’ in Mark Weller,  Jake Rylatt and 
Alexia Solomou (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 2014). 
97
 Lubell (2014) and Tom Ruys, Armed attack and Article 51 of the UN Charter (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), p. 262. 
98 Ruys (2013), p. 308. See also Karen Mueller, Jasen Castillo, Forrest Morgan, Negeen Pegahi and Brian 
Rosen, Striking First (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2006). 
99
 Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong, ‘The past and future of the claim of pre‑emptive 
self-defense,’ The American Journal of International Law, 100:3 (2006), pp. 525-550. 
Page 19 of 47
Cambridge University Press
European Journal of International Security
For Peer Review
20 
 
that a nation under attack from international terrorists could act both in reaction to and in 
prevention of future attacks.
100
 At the time, both pre-emptive and preventive strikes, especially 
against Libya, were seriously considered and often excluded for practical and political, and not 
legal or moral reasons.101 When a strike was carried out, it was justified in terms of retaliation 
and the administration did not expand on imminence.
102
 Similarly, the Clinton Administration 
raised the issue of pre-emption when fighting asymmetrical foes.
103
 The US carried out strikes 
against al-Qaeda compounds defining the terrorist group as an ‘imminent threat.’ Asked to 
clarify the meaning of imminence, however, US officials demurred.
104
 9/11 proved a turning 
point for the concept of imminence. 
Exogenous shock: 9/11 and the Bush Administration’s approach to imminence and international 
law 
9/11 represented a Skinnerian ‘exogenous shock.’ Several scholars have explored various facets 
of the Bush Administration’s exploitation of this shock and the insecurities it created.105 What is 
clear is that the attacks provided the Bush Administration with a key reference point. The 
administration could always point to 9/11 as a demonstration of the alleged failure of previous 
                                                            
100
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strategies for US security and call for new (and unprecedented) strategies.106 In these strategies, 
we can identify two main elements. First, the administration applied an extreme interpretation of 
Presidential power. John Yoo who would become one of the administration’s most important 
(and controversial) lawyers, as well as Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld had been long-term critics of limits on presidential power.
107
 The 
administration relied on the 2001 Congressional Authorization for the use of Military Force 
(AUMF). Having received permission to use force, the administration’s view established that 
the President could disregard any statute or regulation that conflicted with his preferred means 
of prosecuting military conflict.
108
 A 2002 Office of Legal Counsel opinion and a later 
Department of Defense report concluded that the President’s Commander in Chief authority 
could ‘render specific conduct, otherwise criminal, not unlawful.’
109
 In the administration’s 
view the AUMF and presidential power were sufficient for the conduct of an unbounded war in 
the new global ‘battlespace.’110  This approach was not limited to the administration’s first term. 
In 2006, after the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld Supreme Court decision, the Department of Justice still 
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refused to acknowledge that Congress had any authority to regulate the President’s conduct in 
military affairs.
111
 Second, the negation of any limits on the President’s conduct of war extended 
to international law. Members of the administration viewed international law and, more 
generally, the rule of law as a hindrance to US action.112 In particular, as Carvin and Williams 
have pointed out, key civilian lawyers within the Bush Administration including David 
Addington, Jay Bybee and Yoo subscribed to a ‘new sovereigntist’ view of international law. In 
this view, they write, international law is ‘seen as vague, unaccountable, undemocratic and 
unenforceable.’
113
 Within the Administration, neo-conservatives also shared views of 
international law as a fastidious constraint on American power.
114
 Rumsfeld famously lamented 
the ‘judicialization of international politics.’115 International law and the rule of law were 
viewed not only as a constraint, but also as weapons the enemy could use to weaken the US.
116
  
Consistent with these beliefs and premises the administration developed an aggressive strategy 
to confront its enemies. The strategy, presented as one of pre-emption, would become a 
cornerstone of the Bush Doctrine.
117
 On the 17
th
 of September, Bush affirmed that new approach 
would stress ‘preemption of future attacks’ over prosecution and the gathering of evidence.118 In 
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the 2002 State of the Union address, Bush similarly stressed the necessity to prevent threats.119 
The strategy was crystallised in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS).
120
 Having called for 
a strategy of pre-emption, the NSS made a specific claim as to the need to ‘adapt the concept of 
imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.’121 The NSS itself 
blurred the distinction between pre-emption and prevention.
 
At one point the document stated 
that the US needed to ‘prevent’ threats by acting ‘preemptively.’
122
 The NSS did not explicitly 
adapt the concept of imminence, nor did the Bush Administration.123 This, however, does not 
mean that debates surrounding pre-emption did not occur during the Bush years. The NSS 
engendered a heated debate regarding pre-emption and the use of force.
124
 The point being made 
here is that imminence was not redefined; it was side-lined.  
At the international level, views of the Bush Doctrine often coincided with views on the Iraq 
War. Even among supporters of the war, however, several governments showed uneasiness 
regarding Bush Administration’s unwillingness to define imminence. The UK and Australia, for 
example, argued that imminence played a prominent role in decision surrounding self-defence 
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and it should have been defined.125 Among scholars and commentators, the vagueness 
surrounding imminence received criticism both at the time and later. As critics noted, the 
identification of criteria for imminence would have represented a key step.
126
 The refusal to 
provide details of what would comprise ‘justifiable preemptive action’ meant, according to 
Patricia Dunmire, that pre-emption and imminence were ‘gradually detached from their 
justificatory context of international law.’
127
 In particular, the NSS seemed to adopt a double 
standard using ‘imminent’ when referring to the framework of international law, but using 
‘sufficient’ - a more ambiguous term - when discussing the US’s justification for action.
128
 
Public statements and internal deliberations confirmed that the administration had no intention 
of redefining imminence.129 As Paul Wolfowitz argued at the time, ‘anyone who believes that 
we can wait until we have certain knowledge that attacks are imminent has failed to connect the 
dots that led to September 11.’130 Similarly, President Bush argued in his 2003 State of the 
Union Speech that waiting until the threat was imminent meant accepting defeat.131 In internal 
deliberations, Donna Star-Deelen has argued, several members of the administration seemed 
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‘unable to articulate the distinction.’132 More crucially, perhaps, officials did not seem to care 
about the distinction, or imminence. US officials made clear that due to the shadowy nature of 
terrorism, uncertainty as to the time and place of the attack was no reason to proceed with 
caution.133  Action, it was argued, should not require ‘clear evidence’ to avoid the impression of 
rewarding the enemy’s defiance.
134
 More generally, as Douglas Feith has reported, the concerns 
of members of the administration included the possibility that Saddam might get stronger in the 
future and that Congress might not authorise the use of force against a future Saddam armed 
with nuclear weapons.
135
 These are concerns clearly associated with preventive war.  
This extremely permissive understanding of how and when the president could use force also 
expanded to the use of drone strikes and targeted killings. The number of drone strikes during 
the Bush Administration was limited, but the administration never developed a separate set of 
arguments to legitimate its conduct of targeted killing. In line with the importance of 
contradiction identified above, it is clear that members of the Bush Administration did not see 
the need to develop specific criteria and justifications for targeted killings. When the first 
official High Value Target (HVT) drone strike was carried out in Yemen against Qaed Salim 
Sinan al-Harethi, Wolfowitz welcomed it as a ‘very successful tactical operation.’136 The 
success of the strike, however, caused international concerns. Asma Jahengir, UN Special 
Rapporteur, wrote that the killing violated international standards of human rights and could set 
                                                            
132
 Donna G. Starr-Deelen, Presidential Policies on terrorism: from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), p. 112. 
133
 Ron Suskin, The One Percent Doctrine (New York: Simon and Schuster 2006), p. 62. 
134
 Douglas Feith, War and Decision (New York: Harper, 2008), p. 306. 
135
 See Feith (2008), pp. 308 and 329. 
136 Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars (London: Serpent’s tail, 2013), p. 77. 
Page 25 of 47
Cambridge University Press
European Journal of International Security
For Peer Review
26 
 
an ‘alarming precedent for extrajudicial executions.’137 The US Government refused to 
comment on the specific incident, but argued the US was at war with al-Qaeda, such conflict 
had no geographical boundaries and the US was in its right to strike at will, everywhere and at 
any time.138 In this sense, imminence was already in the vocabulary of the executive. Contrary 
to Erakat’s argument, however, administrations preceding Obama’s had not engaged in an 
explicit reconceptualisation of imminence.
139
 
Obama the ‘innovating ideologist’ 
Beliefs and intentions: law, counter-terrorism and a new ‘normative colour’  
Debates on continuity and change between Bush and Obama, have characterised the Obama 
Administration from its inception. The Obama Administration abandoned the extreme claims 
regarding Presidential power made during the Bush years.
140
 Similarly, the administration 
adopted a different approach to the rule of law and international law. Beliefs of some of its 
future members demonstrate both the prominence of international law and the need for a more 
lawful conduct of foreign policy. Obama had argued, since 2006, that a respect for the rule of 
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law was necessary if the US wanted to win the ‘global battle of ideas’ against terrorism.141 As 
Daniel Klaidman wrote, the president believed ‘to his core’ that America should have conducted 
a smarter and a more just war.
142
 Harold Koh, future Legal Advisor to the State Department, had 
worked extensively on the importance of international law and on the ‘transmission belt’ 
between international norms and national compliance.
143
 Similarly he had been a long-term 
critic of unrestrained presidential power
144
 and of the Bush Administration’s disregard for both 
domestic and international law.145 David Barron and Martin Lederman (who would work in the 
Office of Legal Counsel) had penned critiques of the Bush Administration’s abuse of 
Presidential power.
146
 In office, many (and key) members of the administration, including the 
president, were lawyers. Furthermore, many of these lawyers came from a liberal background. 
The hiring of Koh at State and Jeh Johnson at the Pentagon typified, according to Klaidman, 
‘the reassertion of law in the terror war.’147 Under Obama, the rule of law was also more firmly 
institutionalised. During the transition, Tom Donilon developed a National Security Council 
decision-making process that ensured a more direct involvement of lawyers.
148
 As Goldsmith 
                                                            
141
 Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope (New York: Random House, 2006), p. 308. 
142
 Daniel Klaidman, Kill or capture (New York: Mariner Books, 2013), p. 98. 
143 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Why do nations obey international law?’ The Yale Law Journal, 106:8 (1997), 
pp. 2599-2659. 
144
 Harold Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair (Yale: 
Yale University Press, 1990). 
145 Koh, ‘Comment’ in Doyle (2008). 
146
 See Barron (2008a) and David Barron and Martin Lederman, ‘The Commander in Chief at the lowest 
ebb: a constitutional history,’ Harvard Law Review, 121:4 (Feb. 2008b), pp. 941-1111. 
147
 Klaidman (2013), p. 207. 
148 Savage (2015), p. 64. 
Page 27 of 47
Cambridge University Press
European Journal of International Security
For Peer Review
28 
 
convincingly shows, several self-imposed restrictions149 can only be explained by ‘a genuine 
ideological and intellectual commitment’ to the rule of law.150  
The language in the early month reflected the centrality of international law among the 
administration’s beliefs and interests. Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, for 
example positioned international law and the just war tradition at the heart of foreign policy.
151
 
Officials consistently and publicly acknowledged the role of international law
152
 and made clear 
the importance of respecting its principles. International law and the rule of law were elements 
of US strength, not weaknesses exploited by the enemy.
153
 ‘Lawyerliness,’ Savage summarised, 
‘suffused the Obama Administration.’
154
  
Among the president’s key beliefs, the need to strengthen counter-terrorism was also prominent. 
Since the campaign, the Obama team had criticized the Bush Administration for many of its 
foreign policy choices and for its aggressiveness in pursuing them. On counter-terrorism, 
however, Obama accused his predecessor of having been soft on al-Qaeda.155 In this sense, the 
administration gave early signals of its intention to strengthen counter-terrorism while 
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respecting international law. Imminence emerged from the start as an important criterion for 
action. In a famous speech against the Iraq War, then Senator Obama had made clear that he 
opposed the war since Saddam did not pose an imminent threat to the US.
156
 Similarly, in The 
Audacity of Hope, the future President had made clear how imminence represented a key factor 
in the conduct of counterterrorism.
157
 Similarly, Koh had highlighted the importance of 
imminence.
158
  
In line with Skinner’s approach this overview does not hope to get into the policymakers’ heads.  
The analysis has contrasted the beliefs held by Bush Administration officials and those held by 
members of the Obama Administration. This has provided a necessary background to 
corroborate this article’s interpretation through an emphasis on the coherence of actors’ 
professed principles as well as on the compatibility between beliefs of the actors and intentions 
we are assigning them.  
Conceptual change: shifts, criticism, and contradictions  
The language adopted by the administration and the emphasis on international law aimed at 
painting Obama’s policies with a new ‘normative colour.’ Klaidman wrote that such an effort 
created, from the start, a key conundrum: how to continue counter‑terrorism operations while at 
the same time achieving the publicly stated objective of scaling down the war on terror 
                                                            
156
 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks against the Iraq War,’ 2 October 2002 
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framework.159 In Farr’s terms, this represented the administration’s contradiction.  It concerned 
inconsistencies between beliefs of its key members and its rhetoric of change and international 
law, on one side, and its practice on the other.  
In the very early days, Obama clearly discussed the importance of language and the perils of 
using ‘war on terror’ to describe US counter-terrorism.
160
 The administration substituted ‘Global 
War on Terror’ with ‘overseas contingency operations.’
161
 As Adam Hodges has noted, instead 
of a universal ‘war on terror,’ the administration often talked about two wars (Afghanistan and 
Iraq).
162
 Finally, the administration also made an effort to better specify the enemies it was 
fighting; no longer a global war against a concept, but a struggle against specific groups in 
specific places.163 As several scholars have noted, however, these early shifts did not represent a 
radical change.
164
 In spite of recognising the need to abandon the language of the ‘war on 
terror,’ the administration adopted many of the narratives (including the ‘war’ narrative) 
established by its predecessor.165  
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160
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161 See Barack Obama, ‘Letter to Congressional Leaders Designating Funds for Overseas Contingency 
Operations/Global War on Terrorism,’ 23 December 2011, available at 
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=} accessed 6 January 2017. Later labels would include constructions like ‘global struggle against violent 
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With the administration seemingly betraying its message of change, shifts in the strategic and 
political contexts also contributed to the emergence of criticism. At the strategic level, the failed 
‘underwear bomber’ terror plot of Christmas 2009 represented a ‘pivotal moment’ for the 
administration.166 The intelligence failure and the mismanagement of the plot’s aftermath167 
radically changed the domestic political context. Cheney, who had been criticising the 
administration’s approach since it took office, launched a Republican offensive accusing the 
administration of ‘pretending’ that the US was not at war. Other Republicans portrayed the 
President as weak.
168
 Republicans seemed to take back ownership of the ‘terrorism’ issue. In a 
shocking victory, Republican Scott Brown relied on a ‘terrorism platform’ to win the Senate 
seat vacated by Ted Kennedy’s death; a victory that meant the loss of the Senate for the 
Democrats.
169
 The administration seemed to succumb to this Republican surge and was 
compelled to backtrack on some of its policies such as the closure of Guantanamo and the 
civilian trial of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.170 The message of change and 
respect for international law was also contradicted by the administration's early approach to 
counter-terrorism. Drone strikes boomed in Obama’s first-term. By December 2013, the 
President had authorised 322 strikes in Pakistan alone171 - with a peak of 122 in 2010 - 
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compared to the forty-eight strikes during Bush’s two terms in office.172 Obama also took an 
unprecedented role as the ‘ultimate’ decision-maker on targeted killing.
173
 Initially, the 
administration had been particularly silent on its drone policies.
174
 The increased use of the 
weapon added to the sense that the promised change was elusive and helped in raising strong 
criticisms. The administration started to confront criticism from NGOs, journalists and 
international organizations, including the U.N. Special Rapporteur Philip Aston who criticised 
drones and the ‘PlayStation mentality’ they created.175 As Obama clarified, criticisms from 
these sources helped him and the administration realise that the drone program was unregulated 
and this contradicted some of the administration’s key beliefs (as well as rhetoric).
176
 In Holsti’s 
and Farr’s words, the source and contents of these criticisms made the contradiction between 
rhetoric and practice hard to ignore. With the number of drone strikes rising, with criticisms 
coming from several quarters, and with the administration working on a particularly 
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controversial strike - the targeting of radical cleric and American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki - the 
Obama Administration started a public effort to normalise and legitimise drone strikes.177 
The strategy in action: adoption of a term and manipulation of criteria 
The first prong of the administration’s strategy, the reliance of imminence, became explicit near 
the time of Awlaki’s killing. In November 2010, in a court case brought by Awlaki’s father, 
Judge John Bates asked Department of Justice lawyer Douglas Letter to clarify why judicial 
scrutiny was needed for electronic surveillance of US citizens abroad, but not for their targeting. 
Letter replied that in a eavesdropping case: 'you're not being asked to stand at the shoulder of 
the president as the president is trying to decide, is there an imminent threat to the security of 
US nationals…?'178 In September 2011, the strategy’s first prong went public. John Brennan, at 
the time Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, delineated the 
administration’s position. Showing insistence on imminence, he argued that in use of force 
decisions: ‘the question turns principally on how you define imminence.’ Brennan stated that 
the US was finding ‘increasing recognition in the international community that a more flexible 
understanding of imminence might be appropriate.’179  Something the Bush Administration had 
also recognised.  
The Obama Administration, however, had also started working on the second prong of the 
strategy - changing the criteria defining the concept. Having seen the evidence on Awlaki, Koh 
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started developing criteria for imminence. In 2004, after his exit from the Bush Administration, 
Yoo had argued that imminence should have been evaluated as a more discretionary decisional 
standard including three criteria: ‘the probability of an attack,’ ‘the need to take advantage of a 
window of opportunity,’ and ‘the magnitude of the harm.’180 Like Yoo, Koh argued that 
terrorism required an ‘elongated’ notion of imminence and adopted similar criteria.
181
 
Confirming Skinner’s point regarding the freedom of ideologist in manipulating criteria but also 
the need to ‘answer’ at least partially to conventions, the new criteria maintained a connection to 
the temporal nature of imminence through the idea of a ‘window of opportunity.’  
The legitimation effort increased after the killing of Awlaki. The killing engendered 
unprecedented criticism, which exacerbated the contradiction between Obama’s rhetoric of 
respecting the rule of law and aggressive counter-terrorism. In January 2012, pressed by 
questions from his Google Hang-out audience, President Obama justified the use of drones 
relying on the idea of a window of opportunity and suggesting that suspects are targeted before 
they can ‘go in and harm Americans.’
182
 In March 2012, Attorney General Eric Holder publicly 
elaborated on the criteria included in the new concept. Holder argued that whether:  
an individual presents an “imminent threat” incorporates considerations of the 
relevant window of opportunity to act, the possible harm that missing the window 
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would cause to civilians, and the likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks 
against the US.183 
Through memos leaked and released in January 2013 and June 2014, it is now clear that the 
public language was a reflection of the internal decision-making process. In the memo that had 
permitted the killing of Awlaki, Assistant Attorney General Barron did not expand on 
imminence, but he relied on the availability of the concept in domestic and international 
contexts and on its positive normative colour confirming that the targeting of Awlaki was 
permissible, among other reasons, since the cleric represented a ‘continued’ and ‘imminent’ 
threat.
184
  
The results of innovation were evident in the White-Paper, leaked to NBC in January 2013. The 
16-page document explained the criteria for the targeting of US citizens who are also al-Qaeda’s 
‘senior operational leaders,’ providing a clear platform for future policy.185 The Paper 
emphasised the compliance of counterterrorism policies with both domestic and international 
law. Like Brennan in 2011, the Paper made clear that the notion of imminence represented the 
core of the administration’s justification. The memo identified three criteria: the existence of a 
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‘window of opportunity,’ the possibility of reducing collateral damage, and the chance to head 
off future disaster.186  
Late 2012 and early 2013 also provided additional shifts in the relevant contexts. At the 
strategic level, in November 2012, Jeh Johnson made clear that the fight against al-Qaeda and 
associated forces soon would have reached a ‘tipping point’ after which the US should have 
abandoned the ‘armed conflict’ framework. At that time, the US, Johnson argued, would rely on 
law enforcement, with ‘military assets available in reserve to address continuing and imminent 
terrorist threats.’
187
 In the domestic political context, the 2012 Presidential Election and the 
possibility of a Romney victory convinced the administration to codify targeting policies. 
Furthermore, a new wave of criticism emerged from both the Libertarian right - with Rand 
Paul’s filibuster during Brennan’s confirmation as Director of the CIA
 188
 - and civil rights 
groups regarding the targeting of Americans.189 These shifts and criticisms compelled the 
administration to an even stronger effort at legitimation if it wanted to achieve its strategic 
objective of easing the contradiction between practices and beliefs.  
In 2013, during a speech at National Defense University, Obama stated: ‘we act against 
terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people.’ Elaborating on 
the criteria, the President stressed that the available window of opportunity, potential future 
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casualties and other governments’ policies play a role in the decision to target.190 Obama also 
assured that the US had codified in a Presidential Policy Guidance criteria for the targeting of 
individuals.
191
 The documents made clear that targeting decisions relied on the modified 
imminence criteria.192 These conformed to those delineated in the White Paper, and more 
generally to those elaborated through the administration’s innovating ideologist strategy. One 
day before the speech, Holder had also written, in a letter to the Senate, how the 
administration’s interpretation of imminence had guided the targeting of al-Awlaki.193 The 
Department of Defense also confirmed that the criteria developed in the White Paper guided its 
targeting practices.
194
  
The administration continued to insist on the importance of imminence and to elaborate criteria 
for the concept. In 2016, Brian Egan, new Legal Advisor from the State Department, argued that 
imminence played ‘an important role as a matter of policy…even when it is not legally 
required.’ He added that criteria for imminence included:  
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the nature and immediacy of the threat; the probability of an attack; whether the 
anticipated attack is part of a concerted pattern of continuing armed activity; the 
likely scale of the attack and the injury, loss, or damage likely to result therefrom 
in the absence of mitigating action; and the likelihood that there will be other 
opportunities to undertake effective action in self-defense that may be expected to 
cause less serious collateral injury, loss, or damage.
195
  
The inclusion of the ‘immediacy’ of the threat increased the prominence of the temporal 
element and represented a departure from the White Paper. More generally, these criteria 
seemed to represent an effort to bring the modified concept closer to its original international 
law interpretation of imminent as temporally immediate.196 This, however, does not detract from 
the Administration’s conceptual change. The changed concept of imminence is no longer 
limited only to a temporal dimension. The reintroduction of a temporal element permitted the 
Administration’s to increase the plausibility of the manipulation. Confirming these changes, in 
December 2016, the administration published a report on the legal and policy frameworks 
guiding the use of force in counter-terrorism. The president’s foreword argued that the 
codification of this framework represented only the latest demonstration of the importance that 
the Administration assigned to adhering ‘to standards - including international legal standards - 
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that govern the use of force.’197 More importantly, for the purposes of this article, the report re-
confirmed word by word Egan’s criteria for imminence.198  
Legitimation and innovation: the innovating ideologist’s strategy and its limits  
The administration’s insistence on imminence has received strong criticisms. These criticisms 
have targeted not only the conceptual manipulation of imminence, that is, the plausibility of the 
administration’s change of criteria but also the relation between the administration’s 
legitimating principles and its policies; that is, its credibility. Assessing plausibility means 
assessing how the relevant community has received the concept. It is fair to admit that the 
‘tailoring of the normative language’ has been problematic. Commentators and scholars have 
criticised the manipulation; the ‘sleight-of-hand’ is now public.  The changes brought by the 
Obama Administration, however, find some resonance in the concerns of scholars of 
international law and scholars within the just war tradition who have long grappled with the 
issue of imminence and the requirements it imposes on government. Already in 1977, Michael 
Walzer identified some of the difficulties in interpreting ‘imminence’ as a strict temporal 
requirement. He proposed a new threshold that included: a ‘manifest intent to injure,’ an ‘active 
preparation’ that turned that intent into a danger and a ‘general situation’ in which waiting 
‘magnifies the risk.’
199
 As we have seen, at the time of the Bush Administration, several 
scholars pointed to the necessity of updating imminence and developing new criteria. In more 
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recent times, scholars like Daniel Betlehem developed these criteria.200 Egan and the Obama 
Administration explicitly relied on these criteria. The reception of these criteria and of efforts to 
move away from a strictly temporal understanding of imminence has been, at best, mixed.
201
 In 
terms of states’ practice, Michael Scharf has noted how other states seem to have accepted at 
least in part US claims regarding self-defence and imminence.
202
 The statements and practices 
of several states seem to have moved in this direction. The UK Attorney General explicitly 
adopted Betlehem’s (and by extension the Obama Administration’s) understanding of 
imminence and of criteria defining the concept.
203
  As Anthony Dworkin has pointed out, 
several European countries have also accepted US views on self-defence, imminence and 
targeted killing.204 
This debate on manipulation is connected to the debate on interpretation in international law. 
Ian Hurd has argued that legitimating claims, such as those surrounding self-defence, inevitably 
change in the direction states intend, with states’ practice and, generally, based on the practice 
of great powers.
205
  Some scholars have suggested that there is no ‘language’ of international 
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law beyond that spoken by states through their legitimating claim.206 Others have suggested that 
interpretation can be compared to a game. As Rosa Brooks wrote looking at tennis:  
Calling a ball “in” when it just touches the outside of the baseline is skirting the 
edge of the permissible…Calling a ball “in” when you know it landed outside the 
baseline is cheating, but it is still “playing tennis”…Pausing to beat up your 
opponent when he complains that you are cheating is no longer tennis, however; the 
resort to force destroys the game entirely.’207 
The Bush Administration’s arguments regarding waterboarding and torture represented, in 
Brooks’s, view the destruction of the game. It could be argued that the White Paper 
interpretation of imminence constituted cheating. In its more recent interpretation, with a 
renewed emphasis on the temporal element, the administration might be ‘skirting the edge of the 
permissible.’ However, it seems that the administration is still ‘playing tennis.’ The increased 
international acceptance discussed above seems to support recognition of the plausibility of the 
Administration’s manipulation.  
On credibility, a comprehensive assessment of the administration’s practices will, perhaps, be 
possible in the future. Only in the longer-term discrepancies between legitimation and action 
fully emerge. The Reagan Administration, for example, justified Operation Urgent Fury (the 
invasion of Grenada) relying on the need to protect US students on the island. We now know, 
however, that the conduct of operations showed that the administration had little interest in the 
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safety of the students and little knowledge regarding their location.208 On the Obama 
Administration, there is evidence that the criteria of imminence set by the Administration have 
been guiding its targeting policies.   
First, high-value targets cases show how imminence and the criteria identified played a role. 
The targeting of Anwar al-Awlaki is one such case. As Savage convincingly argued, Awlaki 
had been on the US radar at least since the Bush Administration. The decision to kill him, 
however, was made only after the failed Christmas plot and after evidence of contact between 
Awlaki and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. These contacts had made Awlaki an imminent 
threat.209 In line with Wheeler’s suggestion, a second high-level case included the refusal to 
target a suspect due to the fact that he did not pose an imminent threat. Having tracked al-
Shaabab in Somalia for months, members of the administration were pushing to eliminate the 
leaders of its two main factions. One of these factions, led by Sheikh Mohamed Mukhtar 
Abdirahman had declared allegiance to al-Qaeda and intelligence indicated that it was ready to 
target the West. The second faction, led by Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, on the contrary, was 
focused on internal conflict. In an interagency meeting, Koh strongly opposed the targeting of 
the latter on the basis of imminence. ‘If Robow was not focused on attacking Americans,’ Koh 
stated, he did not represent an imminent threat to US security and hence the US ‘could not use 
self-defense justification for killing him.’ Robow was not targeted.210  
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Second, it must be noted that the heat surrounding the drone debate and the salience of some 
strikes have perhaps obscured the fact that drone strikes have declined since Obama’s first-term 
and since the development and publication of the policy planning guidance. The guidance had 
the effect of standardizing and institutionalizing rigorous criteria for analysis and action.211 UN 
Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson confirmed that the ‘reigning in’ of the CIA under stricter 
Presidential control, led to a decline in strikes and in civilian casualties.
212
 Several reports have 
more generally suggested that drone strikes dropped outside hot battlefields in Obama’s second 
term.
213
 Perhaps, an additional confirmation also comes from the correlation between the Trump 
Administration’s decision to relax the policy guidelines established under Obama
214
 and a spike 
in drone strikes in Trump’s first months in office.215   
Identifying a drop in drone strikes during the second term of the Obama Presidency, however, 
exposes the intricate relation between legitimation and action in US foreign policy. In his 
discussion of the role of law and legitimation in the Cuban Missile crisis, Abraham Chayes 
identified a ‘continuous feedback’ between principles and actions limiting the amount of 
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options available.216 Furthermore, as Chayes argued, the fact that we cannot find a direct 
causation between principles and policies ‘is no more fatal to the operation of legal factors than 
of any other kind of indeterminate data or analysis bearing on decision.’
217
 In the context of the 
Obama Administration’s drone strikes, then, it might be easy to find cases in which the 
administration exceeded its professed principles. What this exercise obscures, however, is ‘the 
scores of times’ in which principles pre-empted operations and policies that never made it onto 
the agenda.218 Looking at the Obama Administration’s credibility, it might not be right to 
suggest that legitimating principles directly caused a restraint in policies, but rushing to the 
opposite view - that they had no role - is unconvincing.  
Conclusion 
In a 2016 lecture, Harold Koh argued that the US government should have abandoned ideas 
regarding war as a ‘legal black hole.’ It should have engaged instead in a ‘translation exercise 
from previously agreed international rules,’ adapting these rules while maintaining their spirit 
and while acting within the framework of the law.
219
 This article has provided a Skinnerian 
interpretation of this translation effort by exploring the Obama Administration’s legitimation of 
targeted killings. The analysis has placed conceptual change at the centre of foreign policy 
legitimation. 
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First, the analysis has shown how imminence represented an available favourable evaluative-
descriptive term within domestic and international legal conventions. Second, the analysis has 
explored the role of contextual shifts, contradictions and criticism in creating the conditions for 
conceptual change. The analysis has identified a key contradiction for the administration: how 
to pursue an aggressive counter-terrorism program while achieving the strategic objective of 
putting US counter-terrorism on a sounder legal footing, abandoning the ‘war on terror’ 
framework, and establishing a contrast with the Bush Administration. The analysis has 
suggested that it was the importance of this strategic aim and its conformity with strongly held 
views and beliefs of members of the administration that led it to address this contradiction and 
not others. At different points, the analysis has suggested that shifts in the strategic and 
domestic political contexts, as well as criticisms, spurred conceptual change. Third, through the 
two steps of the innovating ideologist’s strategy, the analysis has shown how imminence turned 
into one of the cornerstones of the Obama Administration’s justifications of counter-terrorism. 
As William Banks wrote, ‘the self-defence justification…matured and sharpened…to focus on 
the imminence of the continuing threat posed by the target.’220 Imminence has been at the 
forefront of the administration’s justifications from 2011 to 2016. The administration also 
proceeded to change the criteria, building a more permissive imminence, while trying to 
maintain its normative colour.  
Exploring this process of conceptual change, the article has made important theoretical 
contributions. The article has emphasised the importance of innovating ideologist strategies in 
legitimating foreign policy practice; as well as the benefits and limits inherent in these 
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strategies. The analysis has reaffirmed and expanded the role of Skinner in IR. The analysis has 
emphasised the importance of exploring an actor’s beliefs and intentions. It has identified the 
role played by criticisms in bringing contradictions to the fore, also suggesting why some 
criticisms are addressed while other are ignored. Finally, the focus on a specific strategy (the 
adoption of a term with a favourable normative colour) has permitted the development of an 
original typology of limits and of strategies to assess whether they are respected. These 
contributions open avenues of future research, suggesting the possibility of developing this 
Skinnerian framework along two main lines.  
The typology of limits and the criteria developed to assess the respect of these limits provide a 
sophisticated account of the relation between legitimation and action in US foreign policy. The 
three types of limits seem to provide a three steps framework to explore foreign policy 
decisions. First, the scholar can assess what concepts policymakers adopted and what 
connotations and histories these concepts have. Second, the extent of the manipulation, as we 
have seen, can be assessed by relying on both the understanding and the reception of the 
concept in the relevant community. Third, the credibility of the actor can be assessed by looking 
at the relation between legitimation and actions. A second line of inquiry could explore 
additional cases of innovating ideologist strategies. ‘Assassination’ is an interesting case in this 
context. Here we see first a change of criteria of what constitutes assassination in the aftermath 
of the Ford Administration’s Executive Order 11905 banning the practice.
221
 Second, the 
substitution of ‘assassination’ with ‘targeted killings,’ seems to conform to Skinner’s recent 
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analysis of paradiastole in which a term with a negative connotation is substituted with a 
‘neighbouring’ term with a more positive or a neutral one.  
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